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A Recommendation for a California Policy 
By Senator Dan McCorquodale 
California Legislature 
Senate· Commission on Corporate Governance 




The Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder 
Rights and Securities Transactions having studied the issue of cor-
porate takeovers, submits the following conclusions and recommenda-
tions to the Legislature: 
Conclusions: 
• A California corporate takeover law would be an ineffective 
protection of corporations, workers and shareholders since it 
would apply to a minimal number of corporations having busi-
ness contacts in the State. 
• A national law requiring minimal standards of conduct for cor-
porations, bidders and investors would reduce jurisdictional 
competition and claims among states. 
• Without jurisdiction the Legislature cannot adequately address 
and resolve conflicts between management and owners of corpo-
rations. 
Recommendations: 
• The California Legislature should support federal preemption of 
state takeover laws. 
• The California Legislature should support state legislative 
proposals which will add to the protection of shareholders and 
pension investments. 
• The California Legislature should support state legislative 
proposals relating to takeover activities when there is a potential 
for economic hardship to small corporations and their share-
holders. 
• Problems associated with corporate takeovers such as depletion 
of assets and resources, debt burdens to corporations and other 
dislocations to the State's economy should be resolved as issues 
separate from tender offer legislation. 
Dan McCorquodale is Chairman of the Senate Commission on Cor-
porate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions 
and represents the San Jose and Modesto areas in the California legis-
lature. 
some form of legislation to restrict 
'-""'""'" have restricted tender 
takeover law will effect relatively few corporations, 
chosen to incorporate in the State or have suffi-
cient business contacts to come under the jurisdiction of the State's 
Section 2115. A law will neither abet nor deter 
The passage of takeover legislation at this 
ineffective protection of shareholders, workers and 
, as well as a deception of public policy . 
. . . should be limited to takeover 
infringe upon the appropriate 
corporate governance and inter-
legislative proposals, the Senate Commis-
Shareholder Rights and Securities 
federal preemption of all states' laws relat-
activities. The preemption as described by the 
limited to takeover activities and not infringe 
state interests of corporate governance and inter-
be drawn to separate internal management affairs 
takeover issues of corporate control. In addi-
associated with takeovers, such as plant closings 
and resources, should be resolved as separate 
diminish the seriousness of these issues or their 
economy, resources and workers. 
This recommendation is limited to federal preemption through amend-
ment to the Williams Act, applicable to all corporations with a class 
of equity securities registered under Section 12 or subject to Section 
l5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the following 
standards: 
(a) Voting rights based on percent of ownership; 
(b) Voting rights based on duration of ownership; 
(c) Poison pills; 
(d) Second step "cash out" transactions; 
(e) Greenmail; 
(f) Prohibitions of equitable remedies; 
(g) "Fair price" for cash out mergers; 
(h) "Drop and sweep" purchases, and 
(i) Disclosure rules for stating an intent to control a corporation. 
The recommendation is not intended to be prescriptive. California 
should have a voice in determining federal standards, but it is 
presumptuous to assume the actions of Congress and contradictory to 
circumscribe the rules for other states. Corporate takeovers are a na-
tional or perhaps, an international problem that cannot and should not 
be resolved by fifty separate state laws. 
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2 LACK OF JURISDICTION In most of preempt-ed by other states, such as virtue of a corporation hav-
the to select a choice of law through incorporation. Even 
if a corporation had a of its property, payroll, sales, share-
holder and its located in California, it would not exclu-
sively come under California laws should it choose to incorporate in 
another state. 
The is that the sixth largest economy 
California can claim authority over only three Fortune 
and less than four percent of New York Stock Ex-
companies. Corporate laws affecting Times-Mirror, 
or Atlantic Richfield for example are made not in 
Sacramento or D.C., but in Dover, Delaware. The 
merits of takeover legislation matter little, if California does not have 
jurisdiction over corporations. 
Despite having the sixth largest economy in the 
world, California can claim authority over only 
three Forture 500 companies. 
It is also quite clear that California cannot enact corporation laws 
even if to do so. which as attractive to 
It should 
dividends or valuation 
ble to shareholders. 
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as the laws of Delaware or states com-
of Delaware's laws 
In some instances such the declaration of 
Delaware law is favora-
However, California should not enter into a competition for incorpo-
rations which it cannot win without substantially redirecting state law. 
The State should have the freedom to determine laws based upon eco-
nomic, social, cultural and historical justification rather than a 
response to coercive competition between states. Delaware as an ex-
ample, has a free hand to enact corporate laws which have relatively 
little effect on their own citizens except to provide additional revenue 
in franchise taxes and a disproportional effect on otherstates ability to 
regulate corporations. 
As a small state with a modest economy, Delaware is the overwhelm-
ing choice of incorporation for corporations having their principal 
business contacts in other states. In addition, Delaware courts have 
established a body of case law unrivaled by other states. The incen-
tives for Delaware incorporation are not likely to be reversed by the 
passage of a California takeover law. A law which would likely 
reverse past state pol icy. 
Califorina Jaws do not protect Delaware 
corporations. 
Other states such as New York that have passed takeover laws with 
less balance and equity than the Delaware takeover law at the behest 
of their business lobbyists with such features as a five year prohibi-
tion on the divestiture of assets, lengthy disclosures and long tender 
periods have not experienced a return of corporations from Delaware. 
In most instances, state legislatures have reacted to the intimidation of 
a single corporation's threat to leave for Delaware, by immediately 
enacting protective legislation. This has been the case in Arizona 
(Greyhound), Minnesota (Dayton-Hudson). New Jersey (Singer), 
Washington (Boeing), and Ohio (Goodyear) to name just a few 
examples. 
5 
The California Legislature, much to its credit, has resisted overreaction 
despite takeover attempts on some of the major corporations in the state. 
Perhaps that is due to a recognition of the inefficacy of a state takeover law. 
Other states ... that have passed takeover laws ... 
have not experienced a return of corporations from 
Delaware. 
Although California would like to provide a better business climate, 
that goal is unlikely to be realized by legislation that has a narrow 
application of relatively few corporations incorporated in California. 
California laws do not protect Delaware corporations. 
6 
3 CALIFORNIA ALTERNATIVES California has three alternatives: (l) do nothing and continue to abrogate authority over corporations with substantial business 
pass a takeover law which applies only to a relatively 
or assert jurisdiction through federal preemption 
of state laws virtue of its representation. In light of 
these facts, the best alternative is to attempt to assert jurisdiction 
through federal preemption of state laws. Preemption would set a 
floor for shareholder protections and a ceiling for management 
prerogatives in the governance of corporations. States would be free 
to set additional standards above the floor or below the ceiling. With 
such a minimum federal even set at a base approximating 
existing Delaware law is not being advocated), states would 
be free to decide an appropriate standard for governance of corpora-
tions with the that Delaware or some other state would not 
continue the downward spiral of shareholder rights. 
There is nothing wrong with states having different standards 
for corporate behavior. What is divisive is the competition to lower 
standards in the "race to the bottom·'. Minimal federal preemptive 
standards would establish a finish line for the race to the bottom. 
Minimal federal standards would establish a 
finish line in the race to the bottom. 
of multi-state claims and disputes over 
""·'"''w'-''-" as the in state laws are 
is not to the states' rights claim 
which was a contention in the Indiana takeover case. 
To the contrary, such would promote states· rights. Differ-
ences in governance standards should reflect regional anomalies, not 
7 
state entrepreneurialism. To restate the earlier question: Would 
California be better served being preempted by Congress or preempt-
ed by the Delaware Legislature? The current system in which a post 
office drop determines political and corporate behavior is totally irra-
tional. It is an unimaginable metaphor for democracy. 
Differences in governance standards should reflect 
regional anomalies, not state entrepreneurialism. 
What is a more reasonable alternative? 
A federal takeover law recognizing two precepts: 
(l) Regulation limited to the changes in corporate control. 
Responsibilities for corporate law traditionally vested with states 
should remain with states. 
(2) Neutrality among shareholders and contending parties vying for 
ownership as presumed by the Williams Act. 
The purpose of any law should be to allow the shareholders to make 
an informed decision regarding the ownership of a corporation free 
from coercive offers from both bidders and management. With the 
changes in ownership of corporations due to a shift of corporate equi-
ty to large pension funds perceptions of bias may have changed. This 
is but another reason to reexamine federal Jaw. 
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A FINAL PERSPECTIVE 
4 California has been affected by the loss of jobs, resources and disrup-tions to the economy as much if not more than other states due to 
corporate takeovers of the last few years. Some of this disruption can 
be considered the price for the free movement of capital. 
Number and Value of Mergers and Acquisitions, 1968-1986 a/ 
($ millions) 
:\umber of Total Current 
Year Transactions Value Base bl Dollars 
1968 4,462 $43,609.0 1,514 $28.8 
1969 6,107 23,710.9 2,300 10.3 
1970 5,152 16,414.9 1,671 9.8 
1971 4,608 12,619.3 1,707 7.4 
1972 4,801 16,680.5 1,930 8.6 
1973 4,040 16.664.5 1,574 10.6 
1974 2,861 12,465.6 995 12.5 
1975 2,297 11,796.4 848 13.9 
1976 2,276 20,029.5 998 20.1 
1977 2,224 21,937.1 1,032 21.3 
1978 2,106 34,180.4 1,071 31.9 
1979 2,128 43,535.1 1,047 41.6 
1980 1,889 44,345.7 890 49.8 
1981 2,395 82.617.6 1,126 73.4 
1982 2,346 53,754.5 930 57.8 
1983 2.533 73,080.5 1,077 67.9 
1984 2.543 122,223.7 1,084 112.8 
1985 3,001 179,767.5 1,320 136.2 
1986 3,337 173.300.0 1,274 117.9 
1987 d/ 927 93,100.0 440 211.6 
a; Reported transactions valued al $500,000 or more 
bi The number of transactions for which the price \tas disdosed 
c/ 1\leasured by the gross national product implicit price deflator 
dl Figures as of June 1987 


















































the state has long been a net importer of capital, Califor-
nia has from a total increase in jobs and other benefits to the 
laws. 
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economy. Some measures providing for the protection of 
sudden economic adjustment are warranted, but 
be ineffective if their application is limited to California 
Protection of California's resources must apply to all 
business in our state regardless of their charter. 
uv'"""'" associated with takeovers are a result of 
""'""'"'r and tactics in gaining or maintaining control 
The State cannot correct problems of business 
and often lacks the authority to restrain harmful tactics. 
has been affected by the loss of jobs, 
resources and disruptions to the economy as much 
more than other states ... 
should be to unveil the myth of legal control over 
and restore to California. That can only take 
federal Just as in the story of the Emperor's 
Calitixnia bills itself as the sixth largest economy in 
control over the governance of the largest cor-
business in the State. This recommendation should 
nakedness of its authority and debunk the myth 
and endorse federal preemption of state takeover 
5 THE GOVERNANCE COMMISSION The California Senate created the Commission on Corporate Gover-nance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions in 1986 to 
evaluate laws relating to and practices of corporate management, in-
vestment managers and investors, with particular concern to recon-
ciling the need to establish stability for corporations operating in or 
desiring to locate in California with the fiduciary obligations of in-
vestment managers and pension fund trustees to prudently invest 
shareholder funds. The Commission's membership represents promi-
nent members of the business, academic, investment and political 
communities. The Commission sponsors legislation and its members 
are often called upon for consultation or testimony on corporation and 
securities law issues before the Legislature. 
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